> ## Content Index > Fetch the complete content index at: https://www.adriadefense.com/llms.txt > Use this file to discover other available public pages before exploring further. # Canada Gave Defense Contracts to Man Probed Over Iran Links - URL: https://www.adriadefense.com/canada-gave-defense-contracts-to-man-probed-over-iran-links/ - Published: 2026-09-05T06:00:26.000Z - Updated: 2026-09-05T06:00:26.000Z - Description: Canadian agencies awarded more than C$2 million in contracts to companies run by a businessman later targeted in citizenship proceedings over alleged Iran military links. - Author: AdriaDefense Desk - Tags: Canada, Iran, Defense Industry, Industry, Procurement Canadian federal and provincial authorities awarded more than **C$2 million in government contracts** to companies controlled by an Edmonton businessman who became the subject of a long-running national security investigation over alleged past involvement in Iranian military technology and procurement, according to documents obtained by Global News. The contracts included business with Canada's **Department of National Defence and Royal Canadian Mounted Police**, creating questions about how procurement screening intersected with intelligence and immigration investigations. The businessman is **Mohammad Reza Ghafouri Fard**, 45, who conducts business in Canada as Sal Ghafouri. He is the son of Hassan Ghafouri Fard, a former Iranian vice president and parliamentarian. A recently declassified Canadian Security Intelligence Service report cited by Global News alleged that before moving permanently to Canada, Ghafouri Fard participated in Iranian military research and procurement activities. The allegations are particularly relevant to the defense sector because the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, or CSIS, linked his earlier work to an Iranian **guided anti-aircraft missile system, electronic jamming technology and procurement of foreign components for military programs**. The intelligence assessment also alleged that procurement activities benefited Iran's military and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Ghafouri Fard has disputed allegations of involvement in military or political activities. The intelligence findings cited in the reporting represent Canadian government allegations rather than a criminal conviction. ## CSIS linked Ghafouri Fard to Iranian military technology According to the declassified intelligence material obtained by Global News, Ghafouri Fard worked as an engineer at Iranian company Rabi Kosar for approximately four years before establishing himself in Canada. CSIS assessed that the company supplied products to SA Iran, an entity connected to Iran's Ministry of Defense, which subsequently supplied the Iranian military and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The intelligence service alleged that his work involved research and development of Iranian military technologies. Among the projects identified in reporting based on the CSIS material was the **Shahin guided anti-aircraft missile system**. The intelligence assessment also associated him with an electronic warfare project known as **RAAD** and a military direction-finding system identified as **SINA**. The intelligence assessment went beyond engineering work. CSIS alleged that Ghafouri Fard participated in a covert procurement structure that used a company in Southeast Asia to acquire components that Iran had difficulty obtaining because of international sanctions. According to the intelligence service, he acknowledged participating in procurement activities that benefited Iranian military organizations, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The distinction matters. Western governments have increasingly focused not only on finished Iranian weapons but also on the international procurement networks that obtain electronics, machine tools and other foreign-origin components required by defense programs. ## His companies received Canadian defense and police contracts Ghafouri Fard returned to Canada as a permanent resident in 2013 and later worked as a research assistant at the University of Alberta, according to the records reviewed by Global News. He subsequently established **Melanite Group**and, in 2018, **Radian Group Ltd.** Canadian corporate records reviewed by the outlet identified him as the sole director of both businesses. The two companies subsequently secured more than **C$2 million in federal and provincial contracts**. Their government customers included the Department of National Defence, Royal Canadian Mounted Police and other public agencies. Some of those contracts touched directly on defense and law enforcement operations. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police contracted one of his businesses to procure a **borescope imaging device**, while other reported work included supplying snow-vehicle components to **Canadian Forces Base Shilo in Manitoba**. A particularly significant timeline emerges from the Department of National Defence procurement. Melanite reportedly received a Department of National Defence standing offer in **December 2023** involving natural-gas regulators at **Canadian Forces Base Suffield in Alberta**. That came after the January 13, 2023 CSIS security screening report that detailed allegations concerning Ghafouri Fard's previous activities. The contracts themselves do not establish that Ghafouri Fard obtained classified information or access to sensitive military systems. The available reporting also does not establish that Canadian government funds were transferred to Iran or used to support Iranian military programs. The case instead raises a narrower but significant question: whether information available to Canada's security and immigration authorities was adequately reflected in government contractor screening. ## Canadian authorities had raised concerns years earlier Canadian security concerns about Ghafouri Fard did not begin with the 2023 intelligence assessment. According to records reviewed by Global News, immigration investigators had raised national security concerns by **2017**, after he applied for Canadian citizenship. His citizenship file subsequently underwent additional security scrutiny. CSIS also alleged that Ghafouri Fard traveled to Iran in 2015 and met representatives of Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security on two occasions. According to the intelligence assessment, those discussions included his employment in Canada and how he should respond if Canadian police or intelligence agencies approached him. The case remained active for years. In **May 2026**, Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada notified Ghafouri Fard that it was beginning proceedings aimed at preventing him from obtaining Canadian citizenship on national security grounds, according to Global News. He is challenging the government's position. The gap between the emergence of security concerns and government procurement activity is likely to attract scrutiny because multiple branches of the Canadian state appear in different parts of the timeline. ## Procurement case highlights contractor-screening challenge The revelations come at a sensitive moment for Western governments attempting to disrupt Iranian defense procurement networks while simultaneously strengthening security around their own military supply chains. The **Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps** has been listed by Canada as a terrorist entity since June 2024\. Ottawa has also imposed sanctions on Iranian individuals and entities associated with the country's military and security apparatus. The Ghafouri Fard case does not demonstrate that Canadian defense technology reached Iran through the contracts identified so far. Nor does the available evidence show that he used access gained through Canadian contracts for intelligence collection. What it does expose is a potential coordination problem between procurement, immigration and national security screening. A contractor can provide ordinary equipment or services without receiving access to classified material. But defense procurement also creates relationships with government departments, military installations and supply chains, making contractor vetting an increasingly important component of economic and national security. That issue extends beyond Canada. NATO governments are expanding defense spending and accelerating procurement while simultaneously confronting sanctions-evasion networks, foreign intelligence activity and attempts by adversarial states to acquire Western technology. The Canadian case provides a concrete example of how those two pressures can collide. --- ## Questions about the Canada-Iran procurement case ### Who is Mohammad Reza Ghafouri Fard? Mohammad Reza Ghafouri Fard is an Edmonton-based businessman who operates in Canada as Sal Ghafouri. He is the son of former Iranian vice president Hassan Ghafouri Fard and controls Melanite Group and Radian Group Ltd. ### How much did his companies receive in Canadian contracts? Public and government records reviewed by Global News showed that his companies received **more than C$2 million** in federal and provincial contracts, including contracts involving the Department of National Defence and Royal Canadian Mounted Police. ### What did CSIS allege about his work in Iran? A declassified CSIS assessment alleged that Ghafouri Fard had participated in research, development and procurement connected to Iranian military programs. Reporting based on the documents linked his previous work to guided anti-aircraft missile technology, electronic warfare equipment and procurement of foreign components. ### Did the Canadian contracts provide Iran with military technology? There is currently no public evidence establishing that the Canadian contracts transferred military technology to Iran or that Ghafouri Fard used them to support Iranian defense programs. The significance of the case centers on contractor screening and the apparent overlap between government procurement and an ongoing national security investigation.