Taiwan Seeks Expanded Defense Cooperation with Europe
Taiwan’s president has called for deeper defense cooperation with European partners, signaling interest in closer industrial and security ties at a time of mounting pressure from Beijing. The outreach reflects Taipei’s effort to diversify strategic partnerships beyond the United States.
Taiwan’s president, Lai Ching-te, has urged European governments to expand defense cooperation with Taipei, framing the proposal as mutually beneficial amid growing geopolitical tensions in the Indo-Pacific.
In an interview with AFP, Lai indicated that Taiwan is seeking closer engagement with Europe’s defense-industrial base, including potential collaboration in technology, supply chains and security-related industries. His remarks come as Taipei continues to modernize its armed forces in response to sustained military pressure from China.
Taiwan remains heavily reliant on the United States for arms sales and security assistance. However, Taipei has increasingly sought to broaden its network of political and economic partners, particularly in Europe, where debates over strategic autonomy and industrial resilience have intensified.
For European governments, the overture arrives at a pivotal moment. The European Union and several member states are accelerating defense production, investing in munitions capacity, and reinforcing supply chains in response to the war in Ukraine and concerns about long-term deterrence posture. Expanding ties with Taiwan could offer European firms access to advanced semiconductor ecosystems, dual-use technologies and a highly developed industrial base.
Taiwan is a central node in the global semiconductor supply chain, with companies such as TSMC playing a critical role in advanced chip production. European policymakers have sought to reduce strategic vulnerabilities in microelectronics, and closer cooperation with Taipei could align with broader efforts to strengthen technological sovereignty.
At the same time, deeper defense engagement would carry diplomatic consequences. Beijing views Taiwan as part of its territory and has repeatedly warned foreign governments against official security cooperation with Taipei. European capitals have largely adhered to a one-China policy framework while expanding economic and parliamentary exchanges with the island.
Any move toward structured defense cooperation would therefore require careful calibration. European states differ in their exposure to Chinese markets and in their appetite for strategic risk. Larger member states such as Germany and France maintain significant economic ties with China, complicating potential shifts in defense engagement.
Still, the proposal underscores Taiwan’s intent to position itself not only as a security recipient but as a contributor to collective resilience. European defense firms, facing rising demand and production constraints, may see opportunities in technology partnerships, joint research, and supply-chain diversification.
For NATO-aligned European states, enhanced dialogue with Taiwan could also form part of a broader assessment of Indo-Pacific security dynamics. The alliance has increasingly described developments in Asia as linked to Euro-Atlantic stability, though it has stopped short of formal commitments in the region.
Whether Europe moves beyond political signaling toward concrete defense-industrial cooperation remains uncertain. But Taipei’s outreach highlights a convergence of interests: Taiwan’s need for diversified security partnerships and Europe’s search for resilient supply chains and strategic leverage in an increasingly contested global order.