A More European NATO Is Inevitable. Europe's Readiness to Lead It Is Not.
A new analysis by leading European defence thinkers argues that NATO is becoming more European whether Europe prepares or not — and that the real deficit is not just capabilities, but political and military leadership. For Central and Eastern Europe, the implications are immediate.
Europe can no longer afford to treat its growing strategic autonomy as a distant policy aspiration. In a new op-ed published by the European Policy Centre (EPC) on 4 April 2026, Dr. Christian Mölling — Director of the EDINA think tank and Senior Adviser at the EPC — and Research Director Torben Schütz argue that the continent must begin contingency planning now, before a more European NATO becomes a fait accompli rather than a managed transition.
The authors frame their argument around a shifting transatlantic dynamic that has fundamentally altered the calculus of European security. Recent friction points — including disagreements over burden-sharing, diverging threat assessments, and signals from Washington that Europe must take greater ownership of its own defence — have made clear that the post-Cold War model of near-unconditional US commitment to European security is giving way to something more conditional and interest-driven. Mölling and Schütz argue that European governments must internalise this shift rather than assume it will reverse.
The structural argument in the analysis goes beyond the familiar inventory of capability shortfalls. While critical gaps in strategic airlift, missile defence, intelligence and surveillance, and integrated command structures remain unresolved, the authors identify a deeper deficit: the absence of political and military leadership capable of converting resources into decisions. Who decides on escalation thresholds? Who translates political objectives into military options? Who assumes command when Washington steps back? These questions, the authors argue, are more urgent than any procurement list.
Nuclear deterrence compounds the challenge. So long as the United States provides nuclear guarantees, it will retain influence over conventional operations as well. The more uncertain those guarantees become, the more pressing the question of European strategic leadership — including, eventually, on nuclear matters.
The analysis also raises an uncomfortable question about Germany. Berlin has announced its ambition to build the Bundeswehr into the strongest conventional army in central Europe, backed by a historic rearmament programme. Yet this effort, the authors note, lacks an explicit European dimension that brings allies on board. The resulting discursive vacuum is already being exploited: in Paris and Warsaw, nationalist narratives of a resurgent Germany threatening its neighbours are gaining traction. For the wider European project, uncoordinated national rearmament carries its own risks.
On the industrial side, the structural fragmentation of Europe's defence sector remains a binding constraint. National procurement strategies, limited cross-border integration, and production bottlenecks continue to constrain the ability to scale output in response to a deteriorating security environment. Recent EU initiatives — including the European Defence Industrial Strategy and joint procurement mechanisms — aim to address these weaknesses, but implementation timelines remain uncertain and funding levels have so far fallen short of what the scale of the challenge demands.
The political geography of this debate matters enormously for Europe's eastern flank. Countries in Central and Eastern Europe have historically anchored their security calculus to NATO's collective defence guarantees and close bilateral ties with Washington. A more European NATO is not, in itself, a threat to this calculus — but it requires these states to be active architects of the new architecture rather than passive recipients of decisions made in Berlin, Paris, or Brussels. For the Western Balkans in particular — where several states remain outside both NATO and the EU, and where the credibility of Euro-Atlantic integration is itself at stake — the signal from this analysis is pointed: the security framework these countries are orienting towards is undergoing fundamental change, and the window for shaping that change is open now.
Mölling and Schütz are careful to avoid the framing of NATO replacement. Their argument is not that Europe should decouple from the United States, but that it must organise itself coherently — developing its own strategic vision, command frameworks, and decision-making capacity — so that it can engage Washington as a capable partner rather than a dependent client. A more European NATO, they write, is viable only if Europe addresses its internal differences: on risk tolerance, on burden-sharing, on the role of nuclear deterrence, and on who leads.
The underlying message carries a note of urgency that goes beyond standard policy caution. The most dangerous illusion, the authors argue, would be to believe that this discussion can be postponed to spare transatlantic sensitivities. NATO will become more European regardless. The question is whether Europe plans that path — or stumbles down it.
