Europe's Critical Mission: Break the Nitrocellulose Bottleneck and Secure the Future of Firepower
The limits of modern high-intensity conflict are currently being set by an elementary chemical compound: nitrocellulose, the highly flammable substance essential for manufacturing gunpowder and propellants.
The ability of European nations to sustain high-intensity military operations—particularly the critical task of supplying Ukraine with artillery ammunition—is currently constrained not by technology, but by a basic chemical compound: nitrocellulose. This fundamental raw material for gunpowder (propellants) has become the defining bottleneck of Western defense production. As the US is a net importer of nitrocellulose, and with Russia successfully ramping up its own production capacity, Europe must immediately overcome the dependence that is severely "hamstrung[ing] Ukraine’s military campaign". Securing an independent, reliable source of propellants is no longer a strategic preference; it is an urgent geopolitical necessity.
The Geopolitical Weaponization of Cotton
The core problem stems from global dependencies on raw materials. To manufacture gunpowder, producers require a specific type of highly processed cotton, known as cotton pulp or cotton linter pulp. China is proving to be a global threat, reportedly monopolising the supply of nitrocellulose raw material derived from Chinese cotton fibers and accounting for almost half of the cotton linter pulp traded globally. This reliance has been exploited with devastating effect. EU internal market commissioner Thierry Breton reported that to produce powder, manufacturers need a specific kind of cotton that mostly comes from China, and "deliveries of this cotton from China stopped as if by chance a few months ago". This perceived weaponization of trade has created an acute supply crisis, forcing French President Emmanuel Macron to admit that "Powder is really what’s lacking today".
The Russian Production Reality Check
While Western manufacturers scramble for raw materials, Russia has demonstrated that large-scale production increases are possible, though costly and complicated. Russia was able to nearly double its gunpowder manufacturing capacity during 2022–2024, compared to the previous decade. This surge was underpinned by a 17 percent average increase in personnel across major gunpowder and explosives plants since 2021, and noticeable increases in key chemical inputs like concentrated nitric acid. This industrial acceleration allows for the presumption that Russia’s production rate of new artillery shells could have doubled to up to 2.2 million per year. However, Russia’s success provides a clear lesson in vulnerability: Russia remains dependent on imported raw materials. Lacking significant domestic cotton cultivation, Russia imports cotton pulp and cellulose nitrate from suppliers like Uzbekistan, India, Malaysia, and Türkiye. Russia's need for millions of artillery shells supplied by North Korea since the autumn of 2023 demonstrates that even doubled domestic output is insufficient to cover wartime consumption. Europe must learn from this: self-sufficiency cannot be achieved by relying on fragile foreign supply chains.
A Call for Industrial Courage: Breaking Free
European leaders are aware of the imperative to act. The European Commission is already subsidizing factories to achieve an ambitious goal of producing two million shells a year. Efforts are underway to modernize existing plants operated by major producers like Rheinmetall, Eurenco, and KNDS, with new facilities planned in countries such as Hungary and Romania.
However, these vital efforts must overcome significant structural hurdles in the Western world:
1. Regulatory Burden: Upgrading and installing new plants is complicated by factors such as environmental regulations, energy, and labour costs.
2. Skilled Labour and Site Selection: There are difficulties in finding suitable production sites and securing skilled workers.
To ensure national security, Europe must prioritize and expedite two critical solution pathways:
1. Accelerated Diversification and Investment
The EU must aggressively pursue the diversification of its raw material sources away from China, looking to alternative suppliers in regions like India and Thailand. Simultaneously, governments must reduce bureaucratic inertia that slows down critical defence modernization projects. Russia’s workforce expansion—57 percent at the Kazan Gunpowder Plant and 39 percent at the Tambov Gunpowder Plant—shows the scale of personnel commitment required to restore high production rates in this labour-intensive industry.
2. Mastering Alternative Cellulose Sources
Europe must rapidly invest in proven alternative raw materials to break the cotton dependency. Manufacturers are already exploring new solutions such as wood cellulose. While cotton cellulose is considered ideal for gunpowder manufacturing due to its specific properties, the geopolitical risks posed by relying solely on cotton far outweigh the technological challenges of transitioning to wood cellulose or other fibres. Ukraine is already conducting experimental harvests of special "gunpowder" cotton varieties in the Odesa region, but the transition to industrial production requires developing massive technological chains potentially worth hundreds of millions of dollars. Europe must match this commitment with industrial-scale investment across the entire chain—from processing nitrocellulose to final propellant charge manufacturing. For the foreseeable future, artillery remains crucial, meaning gunpowder will remain in high demand.
The challenge of removing the bottlenecks in nitrocellulose production is a fundamental test for European sovereignty and military readiness. Europe must act decisively now to ensure its firepower is determined by its strategic resolve, not by the political whim of external monopolies.